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In the Bayesian approach to probability theory, probabil-
ity quantifies a degree of belief for a single trial, without any
a priori connection to limiting frequencies. In this paper we
show that, despite being prescribed by a fundamental law,
probabilities for individual quantum systems can be under-
stood within the Bayesian approach. We argue that the dis-
tinction between classical and quantum probabilities lies not
in their definition, but in the nature of the information they
encode. In the classical world, maximal information about
a physical system is complete in the sense of providing def-
inite answers for all possible questions that can be asked of
the system. In the quantum world, maximal information is
not complete and cannot be completed. Using this distinction,
we show that any Bayesian probability assignment in quan-
tum mechanics must have the form of the quantum probabil-
ity rule, that maximal information about a quantum system
leads to a unique quantum-state assignment, and that quan-
tum theory provides a stronger connection between probabil-
ity and measured frequency than can be justified classically.
Finally we give a Bayesian formulation of quantum-state to-
mography.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are excellent reasons for interpreting quantum
states as states of knowledge [1]. A classic argument
goes back to Einstein [2]. Take two spatially separated
systems A and B prepared in some entangled quantum
state |ψAB〉. By performing the measurement of one or
another of two observables on system A alone, one can
immediately write down a new state for systemB—either
a state drawn from a set {|φB
i
〉} or a set {|ηB
i
〉}, depend-
ing upon which observable is measured. Since this holds
no matter how far apart the two systems are, Einstein
concluded that quantum states cannot be “real states of
affairs.” For whatever the real, objective state of affairs
at B is, it should not depend upon the measurements
made at A. If one accepts this conclusion, one is forced
to admit that the new state (either a |φBi 〉 or a |η
B
i 〉)
represents partial knowledge about system B. In mak-
ing a measurement on A, one learns something about B;
the state itself cannot be construed to be more than a
reflection of the new knowledge.
The physical basis of Einstein’s argument has recently
become amenable to experimental test. Zbinden et al. [3]
have reported an experiment with entangled photons in
which the detectors at A and B are in relative motion.
The experimental data rule out a certain class of realistic
collapse models, i.e., models in which the real state of
affairs at B changes as a result of the measurement at A.
They also put a lower bound of 107 times the speed of
light on the speed of any hypothetical quantum influence
of the measurement at A on the real state of affairs at B.
We accept the conclusion of Einstein’s argument and
start from the premise that “quantum states are states of
knowledge.” An immediate consequence of this premise
is that all the probabilities derived from a quantum state,
even a pure quantum state, depend on a state of knowl-
edge; they are subjective or Bayesian probabilities. We
outline in this paper a general framework for interpreting
all quantum probabilities as subjective.
If two scientists have different states of knowledge
about a system, they will assign different quantum states,
and hence they will assign different probabilities to the
outcomes of some measurements. This situation is com-
monly encountered in quantum cryptographic protocols
[4], where the different players, possibly including an
eavesdropper, have different information about the quan-
tum systems they are handling. In a Bayesian framework,
the probabilities assigned by the different players are all
treated on an equal footing; they are all equally valid.
Subjective probability has, therefore, no a priori con-
nection to measured frequencies and applies naturally to
single quantum systems.
The Bayesian approach has been very successful in
statistics [5–7], observational astronomy [8], artificial in-
telligence [9], and classical statistical mechanics [10].
It seems to be the general opinion, however, that the
Bayesian interpretation is not suitable for quantum-
mechanical probabilities. The probabilities that come
from a pure state are intrinsic and unavoidable. How
can they not be objective properties when they are pre-
scribed by physical law? How can Bayesian quantum
state assignments be anything but arbitrary? Hasn’t the
tight connection between probability and measured fre-
quencies been verified in countless experiments? What
is an experimenter doing in quantum-state tomography
[11,12] if not determining the unknown objective quan-
tum state of a system?
In this paper we give answers to these questions. These
answers turn out to be simple and straightforward. Af-
ter a brief introduction to Bayesian probability theory,
we use Gleason’s theorem [13] to show that any subjec-
tive quantum probability assignment must have the form
of the standard quantum probability rule. We then use a
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version of the so-called Dutch-book argument [14,15] to
show that if a scientist has maximal information about
a quantum system, he must assign a unique pure state.
Our next step is to show that in the case of maximal in-
formation, there is a conceptually simple connection be-
tween (subjective) probability and (measured) frequency,
which is tighter than can be justified classically. Finally,
we consider quantum-state tomography, where an exper-
imenter is said to be determining the “unknown quan-
tum state” of a system from the results of repeated mea-
surements on many copies of the system. An “unknown
quantum state” is an oxymoron if quantum states are
states of knowledge, and we show how it can be elim-
inated from the description of tomography by using a
quantum version of the de Finetti representation theorem
for exchangeable sequences [16,17]. We conclude with a
brief summary and an outlook.
II. BAYESIAN PROBABILITY AND THE
DUTCH BOOK
Bayesian probabilities are degrees of belief or uncer-
tainty [6], which are given an operational definition in
decision theory [5], i.e., the theory of how to decide in
the face of uncertainty. The Bayesian approach captures
naturally the notion that probabilities can change when
new information is obtained. The fundamental Bayesian
probability assignment is to a single system or a single
realization of an experiment. Bayesian probabilities are
defined without any reference to the limiting frequency of
outcomes in repeated experiments. Bayesian probability
theory does allow one to make (probabilistic) predictions
of frequencies, and frequencies in past experiments pro-
vide valuable information for updating the probabilities
assigned to future trials. Despite this connection, prob-
abilities and frequencies are strictly separate concepts.
The simplest operational definition of Bayesian prob-
abilities is in terms of consistent betting behavior, which
is decision theory in a nutshell. Consider a bookie who
offers a bet on the occurrence of outcome E in some situ-
ation. The bettor pays in an amount px—the stake—up
front. The bookie pays out an amount x—the payoff—if
E occurs and nothing otherwise. Conventionally this is
said to be a bet at odds of (1− p)/p to 1. For the bettor
to assign a probability p to outcome E means that he is
willing to accept a bet at these odds with an arbitrary
payoff x determined by the bookie. The payoff can be
positive or negative, meaning that the bettor is willing
to accept either side of the bet. We call a probability
assignment to the outcomes of a betting situation incon-
sistent if it forces the bettor to accept bets in which he
incurs a sure loss; i.e., he loses for every possible out-
come. A probability assignment will be called consistent
if it is not inconsistent in this sense.
Remarkably, consistency alone implies that the bettor
must obey the standard probability rules in his probabil-
ity assignment: (i) p ≥ 0, (ii) p(A ∨ B) = p(A) + p(B)
if A and B are mutually exclusive, (iii) p(A ∧ B) =
p(A|B)p(B), and (iv) p(A) = 1 if A is certain. Any
probability assignment that violates one of these rules
can be shown to be inconsistent in the above sense. This
is the so-called Dutch-book argument [14,15]. We stress
that it does not invoke expectation values or averages
in repeated bets; the bettor who violates the probability
rules suffers a sure loss in a single instance of the betting
situation.
For instance, to show that p(A∨B) = p(A)+p(B) if A
and B are mutually exclusive, assume that the bettor as-
signs probabilities pA, pB, and pC to the three outcomes
A, B, and C = A ∨ B. This means he will accept the
following three bets: a bet on A with payoff xA, which
means the stake is pAxA; a bet on B with payoff xB and
thus with stake pBxB; and a bet on C with payoff xC
and thus with stake pCxC . The net amount the bettor
receives is
R =
{
xA(1− pA)− xBpB + xC(1− pC) if A ∧ ¬B
−xApA + xB(1− pB) + xC(1− pC) if ¬A ∧B
−xApA − xBpB − xCpC if ¬A ∧ ¬B
(1)
The outcome A ∧ B does not occur since A and B are
mutually exclusive. The bookie can choose values xA,
xB, and xC that lead to R < 0 in all three cases unless
0 = det
(
1− pA −pB 1− pC
−pA 1− pB 1− pC
−pA −pB −pC
)
= pA + pB − pC .
(2)
The probability assignment is thus inconsistent unless
p(A ∨B) = pC = pA + pB.
In our experience physicists find it difficult first to
accept and then to embrace the notion that subjective
probabilities receive their only operational significance
from decision theory, the simplest example of which is
the Dutch-book argument in which probabilities are de-
fined to be betting odds. In the Dutch-book approach
the structure of probability theory follows solely from
the requirement of consistent betting behavior. There
is no other input to the theory. For example, normal-
ization of the probabilities for exclusive and exhaustive
alternatives is not an independent assumption, so obvi-
ous that it needs no justification. Instead normalization
follows from probability rules (ii) and (iv) above and thus
receives its sole justification from the requirement of con-
sistent betting behavior.
The only case in which consistency alone leads to a
particular numerical probability is the case of certainty,
or maximal information. If the bettor is certain that the
outcome E will occur, the probability assignment p < 1
means he is willing to take the side of the bookie in a bet
on E, receiving an amount px up front and paying out x
if E occurs, leading to a certain loss of x(1−p) > 0. Con-
sistency thus requires that the bettor assign probability
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p = 1. More generally, consistency requires a particu-
lar probability assignment only in the case of maximal
information, which classically always means p = 1 or 0.
The quantum situation is radically different, since
in quantum theory maximal information is not com-
plete [18]. This notwithstanding, we show that consis-
tency still requires particular probability assignments in
the case of maximal information and, what is more, that
these probabilities are numerically equal to expected lim-
iting frequencies. The keys to these results are Gleason’s
theorem and a quantum variant of the Dutch-book argu-
ment of the previous paragraph.
III. GLEASON’S THEOREM AND THE
QUANTUM PROBABILITY RULE
In order to derive the quantum probability rule, we
make the following assumptions about a quantum system
that is described by a D-dimensional Hilbert space:
(i) Each set of orthogonal one-dimensional projectors,
Πˆk = |ψk〉〈ψk|, k = 1, . . . , D (the vectors |ψk〉make
up an orthonormal basis), corresponds to the com-
plete set of mutually exclusive outcomes of some
measurement, i.e., answers to some question that
can be posed to the system. Throughout this pa-
per, what we mean by a “quantum question” is a
measurement described by such a complete set of
orthogonal one-dimensional projectors.
(ii) The probabilities assigned to the outcomes are con-
sistent in the Dutch-book sense given above.
(iii) The probability assignment is noncontextual [20];
i.e., the probability for obtaining the outcome cor-
responding to a projector Πˆ depends only on Πˆ
itself, not on the other vectors in the orthogonal
set defining a particular measurement. As a conse-
quence, it can be denoted p(Πˆ).
Condition (ii) implies that, for each set of orthogonal
one-dimensional projectors,
D∑
k=1
p(Πˆk) = 1 . (3)
Of course, this is simply the normalization condition, but
in the Bayesian view, normalization is enforced only by
the requirement of consistent betting behavior. Except
in the special case of a two-dimensional Hilbert space,
condition (iii) then implies that there exists a density
operator ρˆ such that for every projector Πˆ = |ψ〉〈ψ|,
p(Πˆ) = tr(ρˆ Πˆ) = 〈ψ|ρˆ|ψ〉 . (4)
This is Gleason’s theorem [13]. It means that, under the
assumptions of (i) the Hilbert-space structure of quantum
questions, (ii) Dutch-book consistency, and (iii) probabil-
ities reflecting the Hilbert-space structure, any subjective
probability assignment must have the form (4), which
is the standard quantum rule for probabilities. Hence
Bayesian “degrees of belief” are restricted by the laws
of nature, and any subjective state of knowledge about a
quantum system can be summarized in a density operator
ρˆ. Since one of the chief challenges of Bayesianism is the
search for methods to translate information into proba-
bility assignments, Gleason’s theorem can be regarded as
the greatest triumph of Bayesian reasoning.
IV. MAXIMAL INFORMATION AND UNIQUE
STATE ASSIGNMENT
Our concern now is to show that if a scientist has
maximal information about a quantum system, Dutch-
book consistency forces him to assign a unique pure state.
Maximal information in the classical case means know-
ing the outcome of all questions with certainty. Glea-
son’s theorem forbids such all-encompassing certainty in
quantum theory. Maximal information in quantum the-
ory instead corresponds to knowing the answer to a max-
imal number of questions (i.e., measurements described
by one-dimensional orthogonal projectors). Suppose then
that a scientist is certain about the outcome of all ques-
tions that share one particular projector Πˆ = |ψ〉〈ψ|.
The scientist is certain that the outcome corresponding
to this projector will occur in response to any of these
questions, so Dutch-book consistency requires that its
probability be p = 1. Now let ρˆ be the state assigned
to the system. In the language of Gleason’s theorem, we
have 〈ψ|ρˆ|ψ〉 = 1. This implies that ρˆ = Πˆ = |ψ〉〈ψ|.
Gleason’s theorem further implies that the scientist can-
not be certain about the outcome of any other questions,
so this is the case where he has maximal information.
Maximal information thus leads to the assignment of a
unique pure state.
Given the assumptions of Gleason’s theorem, if a scien-
tist has maximal information, any state assignment that
is different from the unique pure state derived in the last
paragraph is inconsistent in the Dutch-book sense; i.e.,
it leads to a sure loss for a bet on the outcome of a mea-
surement on a single system that includes the unique pure
state among the outcomes. The Hilbert-space structure
of quantum questions plus noncontextuality alone puts
this tight constraint on probability assignments.
We emphasize that the uniqueness of the quantum
state assignment holds even though no measurement al-
lows an experimenter to decide with certainty between
two nonorthogonal pure-state assignments. Though
maximal information leads to a unique pure state, the
state assignment cannot be verified by addressing ques-
tions to the system. Finding out the state assignment
requires consulting the assigner or the records he leaves
behind. This property is another reason for regarding
quantum states as states of knowledge.
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In both the classical and the quantum case, consistency
enforces a particular probability assignment if and only if
there is maximal information. In the classical case, max-
imal information corresponds to certainty, i.e., the triv-
ial probability assignment 1 or 0, so classically maximal
information is complete. In quantum mechanics, maxi-
mal information leads to a unique pure state assignment
|ψ〉〈ψ|, which is equivalent to prescribing (generally non-
trivial) probabilities for all possible measurements. In
quantum mechanics, maximal information is not com-
plete and cannot be completed.
V. SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY AND
MEASURED FREQUENCY
Up to this point, we have not mentioned repeated ex-
periments or long-run frequencies. Both the Dutch-book
argument and Gleason’s theorem are formulated for sin-
gle systems. There is no justification, at this point, for
identifying the probabilities derived from Gleason’s the-
orem with limiting frequencies. To make the connection
between the above results and repeated measurements,
an additional assumption is needed, namely that the
Hilbert space of N copies of a quantum system is given
by the N -fold tensor product of the single-system Hilbert
space. In doing so, we are assuming that the N copies
of the quantum system are labeled by some additional
degree of freedom that renders irrelevant the symmetries
required for identical particles.
Now assume that a scientist has maximal information
about N copies of a quantum system, specifically the
same maximal information about each system. Apply-
ing Gleason’s theorem and the Dutch-book argument of
Sec. IV to the tensor-product Hilbert space leads to a
unique pure product-state assignment ρˆ(N) = Πˆ⊗· · ·⊗Πˆ,
where Πˆ = |ψ〉〈ψ|. Suppose that repeated measure-
ments are performed using the single-system projectors
Πˆk = |ψk〉〈ψk|, k = 1, . . . , D. The probability of obtain-
ing the sequence of outcomes k1, . . . , kN is given by
p(k1, . . . , kN ) = tr
(
ρˆ(N)Πˆk1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ΠˆkN
)
= pk1 · · · pkN ,
(5)
where
pk = tr(Πˆ Πˆk) = |〈ψk|ψ〉|
2 . (6)
This means that the outcomes of repeated measurements
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The
probability for outcome k to occur nk times, where k =
1, . . . , D and
∑
k
nk = N , is given by the multinomial
distribution,
p(n1, . . . , nD) =
N !
n1! · · ·nD!
pn11 · · · p
nD
D
, (7)
which peaks for large N at nk ≃ Npk, k = 1, . . . , D.
The probability of observing frequencies nk/N close to
pk converges to 1 as N tends to infinity.
In the classical case an i.i.d. assignment is often
the starting point of a probabilistic argument. Yet in
Bayesian probability theory, an i.i.d. can never be strictly
justified except in the case of maximal information, which
in the classical case implies certainty and hence trivial
probabilities. The reason is that the only way to be sure
all the trials are identical in the classical case is to know
everything about them, which implies that the results
of all trials can be predicted with certainty [19]. In con-
trast, to ensure that all systems are the same in quantum
mechanics, it is sufficient to have the maximal, but in-
complete information that leads to a unique pure state.
Thus the quantum i.i.d. assignment (7) is a consequence
of Dutch-book consistency and the Hilbert-space struc-
ture of quantum mechanics.
To summarize, in quantum mechanics maximal infor-
mation leads to nontrivial i.i.d. assignments. Maximal
information means that the pure product-state assign-
ment is the unique consistent state assignment. From
the pure product-state assignment comes the i.i.d. for
the outcomes of any repeated measurement. Together
with elementary combinatorics, this gives the strict con-
nection between probabilities and frequencies displayed
in the laws of large numbers. In this sense, the equality
between probability and limiting frequency holds only in
quantum mechanics.
VI. UNKNOWN QUANTUM STATES AND THE
QUANTUM DE FINETTI REPRESENTATION
An important practical use of repeated measurements
on many copies of a quantum system is in quantum-state
tomography [11,12]. The data gathered from the mea-
surements is said to determine the “unknown quantum
state” of the system. But what can an unknown quantum
state mean? If a quantum state is a state of knowledge,
then it must be known by somebody. If the Bayesian
interpretation of quantum probabilities is to be taken se-
riously, there must be a way to eliminate the “unknown
quantum state” from the description.
The key to this excision is to identify the salient fea-
ture of the state of knowledge that applies when an ex-
perimenter performs quantum-state tomography. That
salient feature is that the experimenter can contemplate
examining an arbitrarily large number of systems, all of
which are equivalent from his perspective. This means
(i) that the density operator ρˆ(N) for N systems should
be symmetric, i.e., invariant under all permutations of
the N systems, and (ii) that this symmetry should hold
for all values of N , with the consistency requirement that
ρˆ(N) arises from tracing out one of the systems in ρˆ(N+1).
A sequence of density operators that satisfies these two
properties is said to be exchangeable, by analogy with de
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Finetti’s definition [14] of exchangeable multi-trial prob-
abilities.
The quantum de Finetti representation theorem [16,17]
establishes that for any exchangeable sequence of density
operators, ρˆ(N) can be written uniquely in the form
ρˆ(N) =
∫
dρ p(ρ) ρ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ , (8)
where the tensor product includes N terms, the inte-
gral runs over the space of density operators, and the
“generating function” p(ρ) can be thought of as a nor-
malized “probability density on density operators.” An
exchangeable density operator captures what an exper-
imenter knows about the systems he intends to exam-
ine. It is a primary quantum-state assignment for multi-
ple copies, with no mention of unknown quantum states.
The content of the quantum de Finetti representation is
that the exchangeable state assignment can nevertheless
be thought of in terms of unknown density operators;
ignorance of which density operator is described by the
generating function.
Exchangeability permits us to describe what is going
on in quantum-state tomography. Suppose two scien-
tists make different exchangeable state assignments and
then jointly collect data from repeated measurements.
Suppose further that the measurements are “tomograph-
ically complete”; i.e., the measurement probabilities for
any density operator are sufficient to determine that den-
sity operator. The two scientists can use the dataD from
an initial set of measurements to update their state as-
signments for further systems. In the limit of a large
number of initial measurements, they will come to agree-
ment on a particular product state ρˆD ⊗ ρˆD ⊗ · · · for
further systems, where ρˆD is determined by the data.
This is what quantum-state tomography is all about. The
updating can be cast as an application of Bayes’s rule to
updating the generating function in light of the data [21].
The only requirement for “coming to agreement” is that
both scientists should have allowed for the possibility of
ρˆD by giving it nonzero support in their initial generating
functions.
VII. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We promised simple answers, and it’s hard to imagine
simpler ones. The physical law that prescribes quan-
tum probabilities is indeed fundamental, but the reason
is that it is a fundamental rule of inference—a law of
thought—for Bayesian probabilities. It follows from re-
quiring Dutch-book consistency for probability assign-
ments that are faithful to the Hilbert-space structure of
quantum questions. These same desiderata require a par-
ticular pure-state assignment when a scientist has maxi-
mal information, and because maximal information is not
complete, they give a strict connection between observed
frequencies and pure-state quantum probabilities. The
notion of an “unknown quantum state,” irreconcilable
with the idea of quantum states as states of knowledge,
can be banished from quantum-state tomography using
the quantum de Finetti representation.
Quantum information science [22] is an emerging field
that uses quantum states to escape the constraints im-
posed on information processing in a realistic/determin-
istic world. The rewards in quantum information science
are great: teleportation of quantum states, distribution
of secret keys for encoding messages securely, and com-
putations done more efficiently on a quantum computer
than on any classical machine. The key to these rewards
is that a quantum world is less constrained than a clas-
sical one. As quantum information science harnesses the
greater range of possibilities available in the quantum
world, we believe it is imperative to understand and elu-
cidate the fundamental principles underlying quantum
mechanics. In this paper we show how to interpret quan-
tum states consistently as states of knowledge, reflecting
what we know about a quantum system. This is just
one step in a broader program to try to disentangle the
subjective and objective aspects of the quantum world
[24]. We leave the last word to Edwin T. Jaynes [23],
who inspired us to pursue the Bayesian view:
Today we are beginning to realize how
much of all physical science is really only in-
formation, organized in a particular way. But
we are far from unravelling the knotty ques-
tion: “To what extent does this information
reside in us, and to what extent is it a prop-
erty of Nature?” . . . Our present QM formal-
ism is a peculiar mixture describing in part
laws of Nature, in part incomplete human
information about Nature—all scrambled up
together by Bohr into an omelette that no-
body has seen how to unscramble. Yet we
think the unscrambling is a prerequisite for
any further advance in basic physical theory
. . . .
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